Let us first consider the five points she addresses:

**Point 1: Engaging Exclusion and Inclusion**

Exclusion and inclusion are general social processes, while crime and criminalization are more specific social processes. In other words, crime and criminalization are processes of exclusion and inclusion with a particular cast of characters, tropes, institutional bases, informal networks, skills and tools. That said, processes of exclusion and inclusion are analytic abstractions that cannot exist independently of specific process in any particular instance or context. When we attempt to generalize our understanding of crime cross-culturally, as per Ben's question, we can compare the ways in which processes of exclusion and inclusion are enacted, expressed, represented, in terms of diverse definitions of crime and criminalization. (Note that we include the deployment of law as part of what we are studying, here we also include informal social processes.)

**Point 2: Considering “Culture”**

Crime and criminalization thus depend on, shape, and disrupt the more general patterns of exclusion and inclusion in a social setting or society. In this framework, new cultural formations of crime and criminalization will modify prevailing time and place-based patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Again, these patterns of inclusion and exclusion are analytic abstractions through which we can do cross-cultural comparison. Who counts as insiders or outsiders, and how the distinction is accomplished, are key aspects of the substance that we discover, document, and interpret in our fieldwork sites or texts.
**Point 3: Axes of Identity Formation and (Inter)Relations**

At the same time, these general and specific processes of social organization and action depend on, shape, and disrupt the axes of identity and difference (both abstract and embodied) through which humans inter-relate (race, sex, gender, class, nation, health status, etc.). (Maybe we should also think of axes of identity and difference as templates for general processes of inclusion and exclusion, crime and criminalization, although they may also act very much like crime and criminalization, as specific processes of inclusion and exclusion. Should we pin this down?)

Even as we find ways to think comparatively and globally about crime and criminalization, we are aware that our scholarly abstractions (general and specific processes)—as well as the particular axes of identity and difference we have discovered and used—may shift in terms of the kind of phenomena involved and their relation to each other. To be flexible in any particular case or situation, as well as overall, we sustain an open orientation toward the possibilities (e.g., direction of causality and effect, level of analysis, degree of interaction, and quality and extent of emergence and decline).

**Point 4: Engaging Exclusion and Inclusion**

These social webs or fabrics test, energize, reproduce and create anew "complex combinations" of action and effect, shaped by particular circumstances, intentions, material and cultural resources—and by the individuals and groups living in, or preying on, that social fabric. Their particular moral or ethical valence arises out of such complex combinations. Thus any adequate analysis—as well as any effort toward finding justice—must take account of such complex combinations.

**Point 5: Scaling**

These analyses would need to take account of varying scales (local/regional/global) and levels of mass mediation (e.g., the story of a crime occurring in and reported by a local journalist in a town newspaper may be picked up, reproduced, and re-imagined in and through various media networks, institutional forums, and genres—with unpredictable effect).

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*With those points in mind, Stephanie Kane pursues Ben Penglase’s question about ethics using the framework developed. She specifically focuses on gender and sexuality as modes of organizing general processes of inclusion and exclusion:*

Studying crime prevention and control, rather than engaging in participant observation of crime-in-action, is a strategic entry-way into the ethnographic arena of crime that diminishes attendant ethical dilemmas of witnessing violence or other forms of harm. Examples of dissertation research currently being carried out by graduate students in our department at Indiana University present instructive ethical dilemmas related to methodology and the dissemination of results.*
One set falls into the category of problems resulting from institutional risk-reduction practices aimed at prevention and control (Jennifer Colanese; Sara Walsh; Cristie Ivie Edge); the other set stems from ethical considerations of institutional management of harm that may be produced without conscious intent by criminal justice practitioners (Stephanie Whitehead and Krista Eckhardt).

I. **Institutional Risk Management: The Ethics of Prevention and Protection**

Getting IRB permission to do research on prisoners is one rather intractable ethical dilemma in the ethnography of crime and justice. There is a tension between protecting inmates from risks associated with dangerous information (e.g. that x raped y) and protecting the university from being sued. Too much caution adversely affects our research, limiting what we can produce. Such limitations can cause the ethnographer's tête-à-tête with inmates and staff within jails and prisons to lose much of its vigor. Jennifer Colanese, for example, is currently carrying out research on Girl Scout Programs in a Juvenile Detention Center. Jennifer chose to study incarcerated youth, a doubly protected category of person. As a result, she has had to have untold patience in going through the IRB process. Without going into the details here, I will share the fact that even after getting necessary permission, that permission is exceedingly narrow in comparison with ordinary contexts. Thus, the institutional mechanisms for insuring ethics narrows and strains our methodologies, sometimes to a disabling extent. At the same time, it is imperative that brave and committed ethnographers not avoid incarceration contexts because they are fraught with difficulties of access. What will emerge from this research is crucial, not just in terms of her acts of witnessing, communication and analysis; it will also help create new pathways through the institutional barricades for future ethnographers.

Another set of institutional practices is less obvious probably because, as researchers, we are not obliged to participate in them, nor are most faculty and graduate students directly affected by them, i.e., university risk-reduction programs and technologies for campus violence. Since the spate of high school and university shootings in recent years, risk-reduction has become an area of intense activity. Although not in the limelight, campus programs to reduce the incidence of sexual assault on university campuses appear pervasive. Despite the fact that these programs were originally spearheaded by feminists, Sara Walsh's research shows that university sexual assault prevention programs can represent, at best, a compromise with feminist practices, principles, and goals. Sara's research reveals how university sexual assault prevention is defined in terms of diminishing the sense of risk that rape poses to the parents of prospective, incoming daughters by drawing attention to certain well lighted paths (as if to reduce the incidence of strangers jumping out from behind bushes), rather than the actual reduction of sexual assault risk. The latter would entail the more difficult and politically fraught work of struggling to confront the dynamics of gender and violence among undergraduate students (e.g. a rape which might take place in a dorm room after one parent's son walked another parent's daughter home along a well-lighted path). When research reveals that the concern for public relations overrides the concern for, e.g. date rape, how does one ethically manage the dissemination of research results without damaging the initiatives that have at least acknowledged campus feminist concerns, compromised as they might be? Sara is struggling with this ethical dilemma now as she writes.
Yet other ethical conundrums arise out of institutional funding decisions based on abstract categories of crime, criminal, and law enforcement. Cristie Ivie Edge helped police in a Midwestern city use federal funds that targeted sex trafficking. She discovered that the central question that police had to grapple with is "What is sex trafficking when most sex workers are women from the region, if not the city, and when no national borders have been crossed?" Does it do justice to the original mission of anti-sex trafficking activists to take advantage of funding by applying the concept of trafficking to any prostitute and her pimp? Is it ethical to ignore not only the lack of international or even state border-crossing while attending to sex workers’ sense of agency and capability in choosing, or leaving, this line of work? Cristie is studying the state and federal policy for clues.

II. **Research on Unconscious or Subconscious Bias Causing Systemic Harm**

How do we assign responsibility, devise training programs, and generally shift cultural understanding when we discover and document the specific ways that unconscious patterns of bias and hate shape the interface between criminal justice institutions and the public? Stephanie Whitehead, for example, rides along with police as they make their rounds, participates in training programs, and analyzes videotape of police-citizen roadway encounters. Her research focuses on how discrimination in police-citizen interactions may result from less than effective communication across racial, gender, and class boundaries through the misreading of language and gesture. In contrast, Krista Eckhardt is analyzing attorney discourse through interviews and the analysis of trial transcripts and news reports from criminal cases in which transgendered persons were murdered in states that have passed hate crime legislation. Her research focuses on the way hetero-normative bias may subconsciously or unconsciously enter into discourse, irrespective of whether an attorney is defending or prosecuting the alleged murderer (i.e., on some level, we might expect a defense attorney to argue that some deception on the part of a transgendered person toward an alleged murderer somehow diminishes responsibility for violence but we should be surprised to find a prosecutor subconsciously or unconsciously accepting this cultural script). Stephanie Whitehead's and Krista's research raises a crucial ethical dilemma that is fundamentally practical in nature, i.e. how do we assign responsibility for widespread cultural biases?